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ABSTRACT
Deep Networks have been shown to provide state-of-the-art perfor-
mance in many machine learning challenges. Unfortunately, they are
susceptible to various types of noise, including adversarial attacks
and corrupted inputs. In this work we introduce a formal definition
of robustness which can be viewed as a localized Lipschitz constant
of the network function, quantified in the domain of the data to be
classified. We compare this notion of robustness to existing ones,
and study its connections with methods in the literature. We eval-
uate this metric by performing experiments on various competitive
vision datasets.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years it has been shown that Deep Learning Architectures
can provide state-of-the-art performance in many machine learning
challenges, ranging from domains as distinct as vision [1, 2, 3] and
natural language processing [4, 5]. This success can be justified
based on their universal approximation properties [6], which allow
them to approximate any function that associates each training set in-
put to its corresponding class. But this is also a double-edged sword,
as the resulting function may not handle well domain shifts (i.e., it
does not generalize well to previously unseen inputs). Adversarial
attacks (i.e., imperceptible changes to the input built specifically to
fool the network function) [7, 8] illustrate the risks of bad general-
ization. Isotropic noise [9] or corrupted inputs [10] are also likely
to produce similar misclassifications. In applications that are very
sensitive to errors, such as autonomous vehicles or robotic assisted
surgery, robustness to such deviations is a key challenge.
In the literature, several methods have been proposed to increase the
robustness of network functions. A first set of approaches proposes
to artificially increase the size of the training set by augmenting it
with corrupted inputs [11, 12, 13, 14]. Then, during the training
phase the network function becomes increasingly robust to the cor-
responding corruptions. However, there is no guarantee that increas-
ing robustness to a specific type of corruptions leads to better perfor-
mance on other types of corruptions, as discussed in [10, 15].
To achieve universal robustness, other approaches target structural
properties of the network function, such as constraining its Lips-
chitz constant to be small. Recall that a function F is said to be
α-Lipschitz with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖ if ‖F (y)−F (x)‖ ≤ α‖y−
x‖,∀x, y. Provided α is small, such a function is robust to small de-
viations around correctly classified inputs, as it holds that: ‖F (x +
ε) − F (x)‖ ≤ α‖ε‖. For example in Parseval Networks [16], the
authors softly enforce the network L2 and L∞ Lipschitz constants
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
10−8
10−4
100
Lipschitz constant
F
ra
ct
io
n
o
f
p
ai
rs
CIFAR-10
CIFAR-100
Imagenet32
Fig. 1. Depiction of the proportion of pairs of training examples of
distinct classes incompatible with a given Lipschitz constraint on the
network function, for various datasets and the L∞ norm.
to be bounded. Another example is [17] where the authors propose
to bound only the L2 norm of the network.
Yet imposing a small Lipschitz constraint on a network function
can be problematic. Indeed, the Lipschitz constraint is controlling
the slope of the function everywhere in the input space. However,
in the context of classification we expect that there can be sharp
transitions in the network function near class boundaries, while the
network function should be smooth away from the boundaries. In
other words, since the smoothness properties of the network func-
tion are location-dependent (e.g., different behavior close to class
boundaries) global Lipschitz metrics may not be meaningful. To il-
lustrate this point, consider Figure 1, where we depict the proportion
of pairs of training set inputs of distinct classes that are incompat-
ible with a given Lipschitz constraint on the network function, for
various datasets [18, 19] and for the L∞ norm. In this example, the
network function is taken to be the one-hot-bit encoded vectors of
the corresponding classes. This example illustrates that for such a
sharp network function a global Lipschitz constraint is not mean-
ingful: unless the Lipschitz constant is large (e.g., greater than 4)
imposing a constraint will prevent the training error from converg-
ing to zero. This example also suggests two related principles that
can lead to better robustness and motivate our proposed robustness
metric: i) robust network functions should not have sharp transitions
in boundary regions, ii) smoothness metrics should be localized.
In this paper we introduce a new formal definition of robustness,
which can be viewed as a local Lipschitz constant of the network
function in the domain of the training samples. This definition of ro-
bustness ensures that any small deviation around a correctly classi-
fied input should not dramatically impact the decision of the network
function. Our proposed definition can be seen as a refinement of
previously proposed Lipschitz constraints, where we consider only
a small radius around the training inputs, rather than constraining
smoothness everywhere in the input space. We then derive reason-
able sufficient conditions to enforce robustness of a deep learning
architecture and show how these conditions support the use of re-
cently introduced methods [12, 16, 17, 20]. Using experiments on
several well-known vision datasets [18, 19] we demonstrate that our
proposed definition of robustness is correlated to the robustness ob-
served in a series of existing network training methods.
2. ROBUSTNESS DEFINITION
Let us consider a (network) function F , which maps data (in an input
space Ω) into a soft decision for classification. Thus F is a function
from an input vector space (or tensor space) to RC , where C is typi-
cally the number of classes. We denote by ‖ · ‖ a fixed metric in the
remaining of this work (in most cases either L2 or L∞).
We are interested in the robustness of the network function F . Con-
trary to Lipschitz constraints, we introduce here a notion of robust-
ness that accounts for:
1. The domain R on which it should be defined,
2. The locality r around each point in R on which it should be
enforced.
More formally we define robust behavior as follows:
Definition 1. We say a network function F is α-robust over a do-
main R and for r > 0, and denote F ∈ Robustα(R, r), if:
‖F (x+ ε)− F (x)‖ ≤ α‖ε‖, ∀x ∈ R,∀ε s.t. ‖ε‖ < r . (1)
In words, F ∈ Robustα(R, r) if F is locally α-Lipschitz within
a radius r of any point in domain R. As such, this is equivalent
to saying: F ∈ Robustα(Ω,+∞) and F is α-Lipschitz. In the
remaining of this work, we are interested in enforcing robustness for
a small radius r around the training examples T .
We also define: αlim(F, r) = inf{α : F ∈ Robustα(r)}, where
αlim(F, r) represents the minimum value α for which a region of
radius r is robust. This allows us to express robustness as a trade-off
between smoothness slope, as captured by α, and radius r.
Consider for instance the sigmoid function σ : x 7→ 1
1+exp(−x)
and
R = {−10, 10}. Figure 2 (Left) depicts the evolution of αlim(σ, r)
as function of r. We observe that the sigmoid function yields an al-
most 0-Lipschitz constant around the two points −10 and 10 for a
very small radius r. When the radius increases, the best Lipschitz
constant also increases. The fact that α is almost 0 when r is small
is an illustration of robustness around R. The sharp transition occur-
ring for r ≈ 10 corresponds to the boundary between classes.
2.1. Relation with Lipschitz constants
Note that it is immediate, by particularization, that if F is α-
Lipschitz then F ∈ Robustα(r),∀r. But if F ∈ Robustα(r)
for some r this does not imply that F is α-Lipschitz: to illus-
trate this, consider a trivial classification problem where the train-
ing set is composed of two distinct vectors x and x′ of distinct
classes. A network function F that uses the mediator hyperplane
to separate the space into two halves has no Lipschitz constant
because of the “infinite” slope close to the hyperplane, despite
αlim(F, ‖x− y‖2/2) = 0. See Figure 2 (Right) for a 1D example.
This is a fundamental result, because the best Lipschitz constant α of
a function F is constrained by the dataset, i.e., if two training points
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Fig. 2. Left: Evolution of r 7→ αlim(σ, r). Right: Representation
of the decision of a mediator hyperplane separator between points 0
and 1.
of different classes are very close to each other then a zero training
error classifier will have a large Lipschitz constant near those points.
The proposed robustness criterion is also constrained by the dataset,
but allows us to reach any small α for a small enough r. Indeed,
denote by cx the class corresponding to training example x. Then,
if F matches a nearest neighbor classifier, we obtain that
F ∈ Robust0

 min
x,x′∈T
c
x 6=cx
′
‖x− x′‖/2

 , (2)
and thus any small value for α is achievable within a small radius
around examples.
3. COMPOSITIONAL ROBUSTNESS
Directly enforcing a robustness criterion on function F can be hard
in practice, because there are many stages that map an input vec-
tor x to the corresponding output F (x). Because of this, several
works in the literature consider each layer of the architecture sepa-
rately [16, 17, 20, 21]. Following this idea, assume that F is obtained
by composing several intermediate functions
F = fℓmax ◦ · · · ◦ f2 ◦ f1 ,
where ℓmax is the depth of the network. For any ℓ, we denote by
F ℓ = f ℓ ◦ · · · ◦ f2 ◦ f1, so that F ℓmax = F . We define layer-
robustness as:
Definition 2. We say that f ℓ is α-robust over R and for r > 0 at
depth ℓ and we denote f ℓ ∈ Robustℓα(R, r) if:
‖f ℓ(y + ε)− f ℓ(y)‖ ≤ α‖ε‖,
∀y ∈ F ℓ−1(R),∀ε s.t. ‖ε‖ < r.
There is a direct relation between robustness of functions f ℓ at the
various layers of the architecture and that of F , as expressed in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that:
f ℓ ∈ Robustℓ
αℓ
(R, r
∏
λ≤ℓ−1
αλ),∀ℓ s.t. 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ ℓmax ,
with αℓ ≤ 1 and denote α =
∏
λ≤ℓmax
αλ, then
F = f ℓmax ◦ · · · ◦ f2 ◦ f1 ∈ Robustα(R, r) .
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Fig. 3. Depiction of the proportion of pairs of training examples of distinct classes incompatible with the proposed robustness definition for
the L∞ norm, as a function of α and for various values of d.
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Fig. 4. Average test set accuracy under Gaussian noise for various datasets and methods.
Proof. The proof is omitted due to lack of space, but available online
at https://github.com/cadurosar/structural_robustness/blob/master/Proof.pdf.
Note that the condition on f ℓ is less demanding if all previous lay-
ers were yielding small values of αℓ (as the demanded radius for
f ℓ robustness is smaller). We thus observe there would be multiple
possible strategies to enforce robustness of F in practice: a) forc-
ing all layers to provide similar robustness or b) focusing only on a
few layers of the architecture. Most proposed methods in the litera-
ture [16, 17, 20] are aiming at enforcing a). In fact, option b) could
be too restrictive and prevent the learning procedure to converge.
4. RELATION WITH EXISTINGMETHODS
We evaluate four of the prior works on the literature from the per-
spective of our proposed robustness measure, namely: Parseval net-
works (P) [16], L2 non-expansive networks (L2NN) [17], Laplacian
networks (L) [20] and Projected Gradient Descent adversarial data
augmentation (PGD) [12]. See Table 1 for a summary.
In [16], networks are trained to be α-Lipschitz for the L2 and L∞
norms in order to achieve robustness. This is achieved by applying a
regularizer such that the weight matrix is, approximately, a Parseval
tight frame [22]. Among the four methods we consider, this is the
only one that leads to improved performance on the clean test set.
However, note that [16] does not strictly enforce the α-Lipschitz
constraint, as it disregards batch normalization layers and uses a
very small regularization factor. This is why it does not prevent the
loss from going to 0 (which theoretically, as seen in Figure 1, could
only be achieved if α is large). This also explains why this method
achieves worse results in robustness than L2NN [17]. In terms of the
proposed definition of robustness, this is a global method that targets
the Robustα(r) metric for r → +∞, penalizing large slopes in the
network function between any two points. We will see that more lo-
calized approaches (targeting finite r) achieve improved robustness.
We denote this method P in the remaining of this work.
L2NN [17] enforces the network to be α-Lipschitz only in terms of
the L2 norm, but does it with a stricter criterion: contrary to P, there
is no regularizer to enforce this condition, which is built into the
structure of the network itself. [17] notes that enforcing a global α-
Lipschitz constant is by itself too hard and that the distances between
examples should not collapse throughout the network architecture.
As such, they also limit the contraction of space. This seems to be
the most robust against L2 attacks of the four methods we consider.
It has also been shown to combine well with PGD training. However,
it is also the method that performs the worse on the clean test set.
In [20], we applied a regularization at each ReLU activation in the
architecture to enforce that the average distance between examples
of different classes remain almost constant from layer to layer. This
is achieved by exploiting the smoothness of the class indicator sig-
nal across the graph generated by intermediate representations at a
given layer. In terms of Definition 1, this method focuses on pairs of
examples of distinct classes and tries to restrict changes in their L2
distance. Thus, [20] indirectly penalizes changes in local smooth-
ness: if we consider (1) with F (.) chosen to be the function that
assigns to each example its true label, and we do not allow the av-
erage r between opposite class examples to change much, then the
corresponding α will change slowly with the training. Note that this
approach and Parseval were shown to complement each other in [20].
We hypothesize that this can be explained because Parseval focuses
on global constraints while [20] favors increased robustness by pre-
serving structure – and thus smoother network function transitions –
around class boundaries. We denote this method L in the remaining
of this work.
Finally, PGD adversarial training [12] is a data augmentation proce-
Method Domain (R) Slope (α) Locality (r) Metric
P Ω Yes No L2 + L∞
L2NN Ω Yes No L2
L T Approx. Yes L2 + cos
PGD augmented T No Yes L∞
Table 1. Summary of the methods and the notions of the introduced
robustness they consider.
dure that generates adversarial examples during the training phase,
by doing multiple iterations of the FGSM method. This leads to a
min-max game between the network and the examples generation,
and is the best adversarial data augmentation that we are aware of.
It works mostly on the domain T , as it increases its size and also
decreases the difference between T and a noisy test domain. This
leads to less domain shift against noisy images on the test, but on the
other hand it increases the domain shift to clean images. As a result,
the networks perform well against noise (isotropic or adversarial) but
have problems with the clean examples. Of the four methods, this
is the only to be applied on the harder Imagenet [23] task (but only
against the weaker targeted white box attack as noted in [15]).
5. EXPERIMENTS
We perform several experiments to evaluate our robustness metric
(Definition 1) and its relation to actual network robustness. Vanilla
(V), Parseval (P) and Laplacian (L) refer to the networks trained
in [20], PGD to the network trained in [12] and L2NN to the net-
work trained in [17]. Note that this direct comparison with the base-
line is not completely fair, as the networks and hyperparameters for
different papers are not the same. For example, PGD has more layers
and parameters, and uses non-adversarial data augmentation during
training, while L2NN does not use a residual architecture.
Figure 3 shows, as a function of α, the ratio between i) the number
of examples within distance d of each other that are not α-robust (for
the L∞ norm) and ii) the total number of example pairs. Note that
d should be roughly interpreted as 2r in our definition of robustness.
As in Figure 1, the network function is taken to be the one-hot-bit
encoded vectors of the corresponding classes. Note that for each
choice of d the curve is initially flat and then drops. In the flat sec-
tion all pairs within d are not α-robust. Interestingly, this figure
shows that the number of pairs of examples in distinct classes that
are closer than d in the input space drops very fast as d is decreased.
The amount becomes negligible for d = 0.3 so that it becomes theo-
retically possible to find a robust network function that is compatible
with almost all pairs of the training set.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of αlim(r) as a function of r for the
various methods. We use 100 training examples and 1000 Gaussian
noise realizations on the CIFAR-10 dataset to estimate αlim(·). Note
that for all methods α increases as a function of r and eventually sat-
urates. Vanilla (V) saturates fastest and at largest value of α because
i) sharp transitions in the network function over short distances are
allowed and ii) the network function produces outputs closest to the
one-hot-bit encoded vector (since V can achieve zero error on the
training set). In contrast, for all the other methods αlim grows more
slowly with r and saturates at a lower value, indicating that transi-
tions in the network function are not as sharp and some examples are
misclassified. Such a compromise between accuracy on the training
set and robustness has been discussed in [24].
The fact that, for both P and L, α saturates for larger r suggests
that the margin between the examples and the boundary is increased
compared to Vanilla. L2NN and PGD saturate at the lowest α val-
ues. We observe a transition for PGD occurring at around r = 0.3
whereas L2NN remains almost constant. This is due to the fact
L2NN enforces a strong Lipschitz constraint (using L2 norm) ev-
erywhere on the function: as a result, the network function is almost
linear between the training samples. As seen in Figure 1, this cre-
ates strong incompatibilities with the training dataset, which is why
L2NN achieves the worst performance on the clean set (c.f. Table 2).
We compare methods in terms of robustness on a recently proposed
benchmark [10]. The results in Table 2 show that PGD achieves
the best accuracy and robustness trade-off. Note that for PGD, our
robustness metric saturates at a relatively small α and grows for r
between 0.2 and 0.4 which correspond to a reasonable range of val-
ues in d ≈ 2r as seen in Figure 3. Table 2 along, with the behavior
of PGD in Figure 5, suggest that improved robustness is achievable
when the network function is smooth locally near the class bound-
aries, i.e., αlim grows in typical range separating examples in differ-
ent classes and saturates at a relative small value. Finally, in Figure 4
we can see that the relative robustness performance of all methods
under Gaussian noise condition is the same as that in Figure 51.
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Fig. 5. Estimations of αlim(r) obtained for different radius r over
training examples with the L∞ norm.
Dataset V P L PGD L2NN V PGD
Clean 11.9% 10.2% 13.2% 12.8% 20.9% 5.0%
Corrupted 31.6% 30.5% 31.3% 18.8% 28.5% 24.4%
relativeMCE 100 103 92 30 39 98
relativeMCE VPGD 102 105 93 31 39 100
Table 2. Test set error on the CIFAR-10 dataset under differ-
ent image conditions. Corrupted refers to the mean test set er-
ror under the 15 image corruption benchmark from [10]. Rel-
ativeMCE for method X is obtained as 100(Corrupted(X) −
Clean(X))/(Corrupted(V )− Clean(V )).
6. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a formal definition of robustness to deviations
inside a norm-ball of radius r around the training set. We have shown
that this definition can be applied to each part of the network sepa-
rately. We derived theoretical and empirical relations between our
proposed definition and existing methods in the literature. Future
work include looking at other types of perturbations (that do not fall
in the norm-ball radius around examples) and fine-tuning already
trained networks to improve their robustness.
1Note that we did not report the results for P for the case of Imagenet32
since we did not find right parameters to obtain a good accuracy on the clean
test set. Also PGD and L2NN results are not reported in the case of CIFAR-
100 and Imagenet32 as pretrained networks were not available.
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Proof. Let us fix x ∈ R.
We proceed by induction. Let us show that if
F ℓ ∈ Robust∏
λ≤ℓ α
λ(R, r) ,
then
F ℓ+1 ∈ Robust∏
λ≤ℓ+1 α
λ(R, r) .
Indeed, let us fix ε s.t. ‖ε‖ < r, then:
‖F ℓ+1(x+ ε)− F ℓ+1(x)‖
= ‖f ℓ+1(F ℓ(x+ ε))− f ℓ+1(F ℓ(x))‖ .
Note that as F ℓ ∈ Robust∏
λ≤ℓ α
λ(R, r), it holds that:
‖F ℓ(x+ ε)− F ℓ(x)‖ ≤
∏
λ≤ℓ
(
αλ
)
‖ε‖ .
So we can write F ℓ(x + ε) = F ℓ(x) + ε′, where ‖ε′‖ ≤
∏
λ≤ℓ
(
αℓ
)
‖ε‖ ≤
r
∏
λ≤ℓ
(
αℓ
)
.
So, we obtain:
‖F ℓ+1(x+ ε)− F ℓ+1(x)‖
= ‖f ℓ+1(F ℓ(x) + ε′)− f ℓ+1(F ℓ(x))‖
≤ αℓ+1‖ε′‖ ≤
∏
λ≤ℓ+1
(
αλ
)
‖ε‖ .
1
